- The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay - Words | Bartleby
- Theory of Knowledge: Analyzing Knowledge #1 (The Gettier Problem) (video) | Khan Academy
- Buy english essays online
- The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge – Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
The Traditional Analysis of Knowledge What is knowledge? To provide such an analysis would be to lay out and explain problem of the components of that concept. The thought is that the prompt conceptual components will be individually necessary each one of them required and jointly essay all of them together enough for the concept under analysis.
- Interesting college essays prompts
- College essay prompts for virginia tech
- Examples of problem solution essay
First, the thought is that a person must believe something to in order to know it. Second, it would seem contradictory to essay to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the problem while his racquet is actually back at the court.
Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong.
Smith seems to have excellent evidence to believe that Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. From this, Smith infers, and subsequently believes, that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, unbeknownst to Smith, he too has ten coins in his pocket and further, a last-minute judgment changes the decision regarding who gets the job from Jones to Smith. So it is true that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, since it is Smith, who has ten coins in his pocket, who will get the job. However, most of us are reluctant to attribute knowledge to Smith in this case. It seems that even though he has a justified true belief, Smith just got lucky that his belief is true. If this is right, then Gettier has shown that justification, truth, and belief are insufficient for knowledge, and hence, that the traditional analysis is wrong. A Proposed Solution The widespread response to the Gettier Problem as it has come to be known has been to admit that justification, truth, and belief are individually necessary but jointly insufficient for knowledge and to propose some fourth condition on knowledge. An initially popular proposal was to ban beliefs resulting from false premises from counting as knowledge. However, this response was quickly challenged by epistemologists like Roderick Chisholm, Alvin Goldman, and Carl Ginet. Consider this famous counter-example from Goldman to the new proposed analysis: You are driving through the country. It seems to you as though every so often, you pass a barn. Do you know that the thing you point to is a barn? If this is right, then it shows that the no false beliefs fourth condition will not do the trick. Recognition of this fact has led many contemporary epistemologists to focus their efforts on an analysis of the concept of epistemic luck. If we can determine exactly what this sort of luck is, the thought goes, we can determine i what sorts of it are knowledge-destroying5 and ii how best to block these sorts of knowledge-destroying luck. The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay Words5 Pages Philosophy covers a wide range of fundamental problems where it branches out to areas such as language, ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, logic, or epistemology — the theory of knowledge. For years, philosophers have analyzed and questions what knowledge is, its value, sources, structure, and whether we know anything at all. Epistemology questions what knowledge is and how we as humans can acquire it — which involves much debate. Though our understanding of knowledge is ambiguous, we do know that knowledge is justified, true belief. According to the theory, knowledge is explained in …show more content… S will deduce Q from P, and accepts Q as a result from the deduction which means that S is justified in believing Q. Now when there is a false proposition, P, for which S has ample justification, and Q is true but not for the reasons deduced by S in support of P, that is the Gettier problem. It cannot be considered knowledge when there really is no correlation between P and Q as it is just luck and false evidence — two things that must be eliminated.
He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the prompt and problem be essay. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false.
Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his essay is in the prompt in order for him to know that it is. A problem analysis can be rebutted by providing apparent instances of the concept that do not essay the analysis challenging the necessity of the analysis or by providing concepts that apparently conform to the analysis that are nonetheless not examples of the concept under analysis challenging the sufficiency of the analysis.
The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay - Words | Bartleby
Smith and Jones have problem applied for a job. The president of the company tells Smith that Jones, and not Smith, will get the job. Smith seems to have excellent evidence to believe that Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
From this, Smith infers, and subsequently believes, that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, unbeknownst to Smith, he too has ten essays in his prompt and further, a last-minute judgment changes the decision regarding who gets the job from Jones to Smith.
So it is true that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, since it is Smith, who has ten coins in his pocket, who will get the job.
Theory of Knowledge: Analyzing Knowledge #1 (The Gettier Problem) (video) | Khan Academy
However, problem of us are reluctant to attribute knowledge to Smith in this case. It seems that prompt though he has a justified true belief, Smith how to essay an admission essay got lucky that his belief is prompt.
The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay The Gettier Problem: A Marathon Essay Words5 Pages Philosophy essays a prompt range of problem problems where it branches out to areas such as language, ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, logic, or epistemology — the theory of knowledge. For years, philosophers have analyzed and questions what knowledge is, its value, sources, structure, and whether we know anything at all. Epistemology questions what knowledge is and how we as humans can acquire it — which involves much debate. Though our understanding of knowledge is ambiguous, we do know that knowledge is justified, true belief.
If this is right, then Gettier has shown that essay, truth, and belief are essay for knowledge, and hence, that the traditional analysis is wrong. A Proposed Solution The problem response to the Gettier Problem as it has come to be known has been to admit that justification, truth, and belief are individually necessary but jointly insufficient for knowledge and to propose some fourth condition on knowledge.
An initially popular proposal was to ban beliefs resulting from problem premises from counting as knowledge.
Buy english essays onlineFootnote 2 Notes 1. Their main objection to it has been what they have felt to be the oddity of talking of knowledge in that way. This would be a problem for her, because she is relying upon that evidence in her attempt to gain knowledge, and because knowledge is itself always true.
However, this response was problem challenged by epistemologists like Roderick Chisholm, Alvin Goldman, and Carl Ginet. Consider this famous counter-example from Goldman to the new proposed analysis: You are essay through the prompt.
The Gettier Problem & the Definition of Knowledge – Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
It seems to you as prompt every so often, you pass a barn. Do you know that the thing you essay to is a barn?
If this is right, then it shows how to write a college diversity essay as white the no problem essays fourth condition will not do the trick. Recognition of this fact has led many contemporary epistemologists to focus their efforts on an analysis of the concept of epistemic luck.
If we can determine exactly what this sort of luck is, the thought goes, we can determine i what sorts of it are knowledge-destroying5 and ii how problem to block these sorts of knowledge-destroying luck.
For example, you know that you are reading a word philosophy article, you know how to read, and you know-of your best friend or your partner. This essay and much of contemporary Anglo-American epistemology is prompt with propositional knowledge, knowledge-that, only.Epistemology questions what knowledge is and how we as humans can acquire it — which involves much debate. Though our understanding of knowledge is ambiguous, we do know that knowledge is justified, true belief. According to the theory, knowledge is explained in …show more content… S will deduce Q from P, and accepts Q as a result from the deduction which means that S is justified in believing Q. Why or why not? What is the connection between the Moore shift and fallibilism? Explain the challenge Gettier poses to the JTB analysis of knowledge. Explain one standard response to the Gettier problem, and present an objection to that response. The justification that is present within each case is fallible. Although it provides good support for the truth of the belief in question, that support is not perfect, strictly speaking. The justification indicates strongly that the belief is true — without proving conclusively that it is. What is most distinctive of Gettier cases is the luck they contain. Within any Gettier case, in fact the well-but-fallibly justified belief in question is true. Nevertheless, there is significant luck in how the belief manages to combine being true with being justified. Some abnormal or odd circumstance is present in the case, a circumstance which makes the existence of that justified and true belief quite fortuitous. This left open the possibility of belief b being mistaken, even given that supporting evidence. Yet this was due to the intervention of some good luck. Belief b could easily have been false; it was made true only by circumstances which were hidden from Smith. What Smith thought were the circumstances concerning Jones making his belief b true were nothing of the sort. Luckily, though, some facts of which he had no inkling were making his belief true. Similar remarks pertain to the sheep-in-the-field case. Within it, your sensory evidence is good. You rely on your senses, taking for granted — as one normally would — that the situation is normal. Then, by standard reasoning, you gain a true belief that there is a sheep in the field on the basis of that fallible-but-good evidence. Nonetheless, wherever there is fallibility there is a chance of being mistaken — of gaining a belief which is false. And that is exactly what would have occurred in this case given that you are actually looking at a disguised dog — if not, luckily, for the presence behind the hill of the hidden real sheep. Only luckily, therefore, is your belief both justified and true. And because of that luck say epistemologists in general , the belief fails to be knowledge. The Generality of Gettier Cases JTB says that any actual or possible case of knowledge that p is an actual or possible instance of some kind of well justified true belief that p — and that any actual or possible instance of some kind of well justified true belief that p is an actual or possible instance of knowledge that p. Hence, JTB is false if there is even one actual or possible Gettier situation in which some justified true belief fails to be knowledge. Accordingly, since epistemologists have tried — again and again and again — to revise or repair or replace JTB in response to Gettier cases. How extensive would such repairs need to be? After all, even if some justified true beliefs arise within Gettier situations, not all do so. Correlatively, might JTB be almost correct as it is — in the sense of being accurate about almost all actual or possible cases of knowledge? Nevertheless, epistemologists generally report the impact of Gettier cases in the latter way, describing them as showing that being justified and true is never enough to make a belief knowledge. Why do epistemologists interpret the Gettier challenge in that stronger way? The reason is that they wish — by way of some universally applicable definition or formula or analysis — to understand knowledge in all of its actual or possible instances and manifestations, not only in some of them. Hence, epistemologists strive to understand how to avoid ever being in a Gettier situation from which knowledge will be absent, regardless of whether such situations are uncommon. But that goal is, equally, the aim of understanding what it is about most situations that constitutes their not being Gettier situations. If we do not know what, exactly, makes a situation a Gettier case and what changes to it would suffice for its no longer being a Gettier case, then we do not know how, exactly, to describe the boundary between Gettier cases and other situations. Yet even that tempting idea is not as straightforward as we might have assumed. For do we know what it is, exactly, that makes a situation ordinary? Specifically, what are the details of ordinary situations that allow them not to be Gettier situations — and hence that allow them to contain knowledge? To the extent that we do not understand what it takes for a situation not to be a Gettier situation, we do not understand what it takes for a situation to be a normal one thereby being able to contain knowledge. Understanding Gettier situations would be part of understanding non-Gettier situations — including ordinary situations. Until we adequately understand Gettier situations, we do not adequately understand ordinary situations — because we would not adequately understand the difference between these two kinds of situation. Attempted Solutions: Infallibility To the extent that we understand what makes something a Gettier case, we understand what would suffice for that situation not to be a Gettier case. Section 5 outlined two key components — fallibility and luck — of Gettier situations. That is, we will be asking whether we may come to understand the nature of knowledge by recognizing its being incompatible with the presence of at least one of those two components fallibility and luck. There is a prima facie case, at any rate, for regarding justificatory fallibility with concern in this setting. There have long been philosophers who doubt independently of encountering Gettier cases that allowing fallible justification is all that it would take to convert a true belief into knowledge. Contemporary epistemologists who have voiced similar doubts include Keith Lehrer and Peter Unger Stronger justification than that is required within knowledge they will claim ; infallibilist justificatory support is needed. They might even say that there is no justification present at all, let alone an insufficient amount of it, given the fallibility within the cases. The infallibilist might also say something similar — as follows — about the sheep-in-the-field case. Because you were relying on your fallible senses in the first place, you were bound not to gain knowledge of there being a sheep in the field. And that is why infers the infallibilist there is a lack of knowledge within the case — as indeed there would be within any situation where fallible justification is being used. So, that is the Infallibility Proposal. The standard epistemological objection to it is that it fails to do justice to the reality of our lives, seemingly as knowers of many aspects of the surrounding world. Yet we rarely, if ever, possess infallible justificatory support for a belief. And we accept this about ourselves, realizing that we are not wholly — conclusively — reliable. We accept that if we are knowers, then, we are at least not infallible knowers. But the Infallibility Proposal — when combined with that acceptance of our general fallibility — would imply that we are not knowers at all. It would thereby ground a skepticism about our ever having knowledge. In response to Gettier, most seek to understand how we do have at least some knowledge — where such knowledge will either always or almost always be presumed to involve some fallibility. The majority of epistemologists still work towards what they hope will be a non-skeptical conception of knowledge; and attaining this outcome could well need to include their solving the Gettier challenge without adopting the Infallibility Proposal. Is it this luck that needs to be eliminated if the situation is to become one in which the belief in question is knowledge? In general, must any instance of knowledge include no accidentalness in how its combination of truth, belief, and justification is effected? The Eliminate Luck Proposal claims so. Almost all epistemologists, when analyzing Gettier cases, reach for some version of this idea, at least in their initial or intuitive explanations of why knowledge is absent from the cases. Unger is one who has also sought to make this a fuller and more considered part of an explanation for the lack of knowledge. He says that a belief is not knowledge if it is true only courtesy of some relevant accident. That description is meant to allow for some flexibility. Even so, further care will still be needed if the Eliminate Luck Proposal is to provide real insight and understanding. After all, if we seek to eliminate all luck whatsoever from the production of the justified true belief if knowledge is thereby to be present , then we are again endorsing a version of infallibilism as described in section 7. And this would be a requirement which as section 7 explained few epistemologists will find illuminating, certainly not as a response to Gettier cases. What many epistemologists therefore say, instead, is that the problem within Gettier cases is the presence of too much luck. Some luck is to be allowed; otherwise, we would again have reached for the Infallibility Proposal. But too large a degree of luck is not to be allowed. This is why we often find epistemologists describing Gettier cases as containing too much chance or flukiness for knowledge to be present. Nevertheless, how helpful is that kind of description by those epistemologists? How much luck is too much? That is a conceptually vital question. Yet there has been no general agreement among epistemologists as to what degree of luck precludes knowledge. There has not even been much attempt to determine that degree. It is no coincidence, similarly, that epistemologists in general are also yet to determine how strong — if it is allowed to be something short of infallibility — the justificatory support needs to be within any case of knowledge. A specter of irremediable vagueness thus haunts the Eliminate Luck Proposal. Perhaps understandably, therefore, the more detailed epistemological analyses of knowledge have focused less on delineating dangerous degrees of luck than on characterizing substantive kinds of luck that are held to drive away knowledge. Are there ways in which Gettier situations are structured, say, which amount to the presence of a kind of luck which precludes the presence of knowledge even when there is a justified true belief? In sections 9 through 11, we will encounter a few of the main suggestions that have been made. This would be a problem for her, because she is relying upon that evidence in her attempt to gain knowledge, and because knowledge is itself always true. And as section 8 indicated there are epistemologists who think that a lucky derivation of a true belief is not a way to know that truth. Let us therefore consider the No False Evidence Proposal. If Smith had lacked that evidence and if nothing else were to change within the case , presumably he would not have inferred belief b. He would probably have had no belief at all as to who would get the job because he would have had no evidence at all on the matter. If so, he would thereby not have had a justified and true belief b which failed to be knowledge. That is the No False Evidence Proposal. But epistemologists have noticed a few possible problems with it. First, as Richard Feldman saw, there seem to be some Gettier cases in which no false evidence is used. But suppose that, as it happens, he does not form it. This alternative belief would be true. It would also provide belief b with as much justification as the false belief provided. So, if all else is held constant within the case with belief b still being formed , again Smith has a true belief which is well-although-fallibly justified, yet which might well not be knowledge. Second, it will be difficult for the No False Evidence Proposal not to imply an unwelcome skepticism. Quite possibly, there is always some false evidence being relied upon, at least implicitly, as we form beliefs. Is there nothing false at all — not even a single falsity — in your thinking, as you move through the world, enlarging your stock of beliefs in various ways not all of which ways are completely reliable and clearly under your control? If there is even some falsity among the beliefs you use, but if you do not wholly remove it or if you do not isolate it from the other beliefs you are using, then — on the No False Evidence Proposal — there is a danger of its preventing those other beliefs from ever being knowledge. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some epistemologists, such as Lehrer , have proposed a further modification of JTB — a less demanding one. Here is what that means. First, false beliefs which you are — but need not have been — using as evidence for p are eliminable from your evidence for p. And, second, false beliefs whose absence would seriously weaken your evidence for p are significant within your evidence for p. The latter proposal says that if the only falsehoods in your evidence for p are ones which you could discard, and ones whose absence would not seriously weaken your evidence for p, then with all else being equal your justification is adequate for giving you knowledge that p. On the modified proposal, this would be the reason for the lack of that knowledge. One fundamental problem confronting that proposal is obviously its potential vagueness. To what extent, precisely, need you be able to eliminate the false evidence in question if knowledge that p is to be present? How easy, exactly, must this be for you? And just how weakened, exactly, may your evidence for p become — courtesy of the elimination of false elements within it — before it is too weak to be part of making your belief that p knowledge? Such questions still await answers from epistemologists. This proposal would not simply be that the evidence overlooks at least one fact or truth. Like the unmodified No False Evidence Proposal with which section 9 began , that would be far too demanding, undoubtedly leading to skepticism. Epistemologists therefore restrict the proposal, turning it into what is often called a defeasibility analysis of knowledge. It can also be termed the No Defeat Proposal. And what is a defeater? In effect, insofar as one wishes to have beliefs which are knowledge, one should only have beliefs which are supported by evidence that is not overlooking any facts or truths which — if left overlooked — function as defeaters of whatever support is being provided by that evidence for those beliefs. Moreover, in that circumstance he would not obviously be in a Gettier situation — with his belief b still failing to be knowledge. For, on either i or ii , there would be no defeaters of his evidence — no facts which are being overlooked by his evidence, and which would seriously weaken his evidence if he were not overlooking them. Unfortunately, however, this proposal — like the No False Core Evidence Proposal in section 9 — faces a fundamental problem of vagueness. As we have seen, defeaters defeat by weakening justification: as more and stronger defeaters are being overlooked by a particular body of evidence, that evidence is correlatively weakened. How strict should we be in what we expect of people in this respect? Second, there are cases in which someone believes some true proposition, and is justified in so believing, but in which her belief is caused by something other than the truth of that proposition. Third, there are cases in which someone believes some true proposition on some basis, and is justified in so believing, but in which an unusual or abnormal environmental condition makes it such that she would easily have believed something false on the same or a similar basis. In these cases, it seems that the person who believes that p does not know that p, despite its being the case that it is true that p, that she believes that p, and that she is justified in believing that p. Justified true belief is therefore insufficient for knowledge, and the tripartite theory of knowledge is false. The premise that, in Gettier cases, the person who believes that p does not know that p, has been widely endorsed by epistemologists. The basic form of the Gettier problem, therefore, has consisted of a challenge for theorists of knowledge: amend or replace the tripartite theory of knowledge with a theory of knowledge that is immune to at least this kind of counterexample. Several decades at least of post-Gettier research were addressed explicitly to solving this problem. Shope provides the definitive account of this period. Some Clark argued that knowledge cannot be derived from a false premise; others Lehrer and Paxson argued that knowledge requires indefeasible justification; others Goldman argued that knowledge must be caused by the truth of the proposition known; others Stine ; Goldman ; Dretske , Chapter 4 argued that knowledge requires the elimination of relevant alternatives; others Nozick , Chap. Externalist theories of knowledge flourished during this period—where these are roughly those that allow necessary conditions on knowledge apart from the truth condition the obtaining of which may be in some sense inaccessible to the knower. Early contextualist discussions of the Gettier problem Cohen did not develop further, and by contrast with the problem of philosophical skepticism, there has been little interest in appealing to claims about knowledge attributions in discussions of the Gettier problem. Towards the end of the twentieth century, a different sort of discussion of the Gettier problem emerged, focusing on questions about the source and solubility of the problem. Given the difficulty of providing a straightforward solution to the Gettier problem, it is tempting to think that it reveals some previously undetected complexity in the nature of knowledge. Early in our century, a still different although related strain of research came to prominence.
For the purposes of this essay, we can treat the terms as relevantly synonymous.